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In this paper, we question the idea that large organizations
have advantages that make them particularly potent rivals.
We argue that the ability of large organizations to amelio-
rate competitive constraints insulates them from an impor-
tant source of organizational development and protects
them from being selected out if unfit. Consequently, we
predict that although large organizations are likely to do
well in technology contests, they also are likely to become
weak competitors over time compared with small organi-
zations. We specify this prediction in an explicit model of
“Red Queen” competition, in which exposure to competi-
tion makes organizations both more viable and stronger
competitors. We find support for our ideas in empirical
estimates of the model obtained using data on hard disk
drive manufacturers. Large organizations led the technolo-
gy race in this market yet failed to develop into stronger
competitors through Red Queen competition compared
with their small counterparts. We also find evidence that all
organizations in this market generated increasingly global
competition, regardless of the competitiveness of their
home markets. In these ways, our model elucidates impor-
tant reasons why some organizations are stronger com-
petitors and reveals how strategies that isolate organiza-
tions from competition may backfire.•
Various organizational theories regard competition to be a
central force shaping, and generated by, organizations. In
contrast to the field of economics, in which competition is
characterized as a property of markets or market segments,
organization theories typically highlight the fact that organiza-
tions themselves differ in their competitiveness. For
instance, resource dependence and network researchers
have revealed important differences among organizations in
terms of their competitive positions (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978; Burt, 1992; Podolny and Stuart, 1995). At the interface
of organization theory and strategic management, central
importance is given to organization-specific differences in
capabilities that make them more or less competitive (Barney
and Zajac, 1994). Similarly, organizational ecology research
often allows for competitive differences among forms of
organizations (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Through such
research, we have made considerable progress in addressing
the question so often asked in casual discussions about busi-
ness: Why are some organizations more competitive than
others?
Perhaps the single most important characteristic determining
an organization’s competitiveness is size, because various
sources of competitive advantage are known to co-vary with
size. Institutional economists have long argued that with
organizational size comes the opportunity to exploit economic
and technical advantages through the rationalization of pro-
duction (Simon, 1945; Chandler, 1977), innovation (Galbraith,
1967), and transactions (Williamson, 1985). The strengths of
large organizations also are featured in sociological research.
Large, established organizations affect their environments
(Selznick, 1949), shaping other organizations (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983) and reducing competitive threats (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). Similarly, scholars have noted the political-
economic importance of large organizations as “consequen-
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tial actors” that affect state policies (Laumann and Knoke,
1987), that are favored by their connections to elite networks
(Mizruchi, 1982; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Palmer and Bar-
ber, 2001), and that are rewarded for being prestigious
(Podolny, 1993). In this light, it is not surprising that studies
reveal an overwhelming survival advantage for large organiza-
tions (Carroll and Hannan, 2000).
Although the competitive advantages of large organizations
are well understood, these very advantages, when viewed
dynamically, can be seen to make larger organizations weak-
er competitors in the long run. To frame our arguments, we
draw a distinction between two distinct logics of competition
prevalent in the literature: competition as contest and compe-
tition as constraint. Understood as a contest, competition
favors organizations that can remain up to date. In many con-
texts, such as in changing, global industries, this logic high-
lights the advantages of large, technically sophisticated orga-
nizations that can stay on the cutting edge. By contrast,
understood as a constraint, competition stimulates organiza-
tional development and selects out weak competitors, further
intensifying competition in a self-exciting process known as
the “Red Queen.” Under this second logic, the very
strengths that make large organizations good at managing
the constraints of competition in the short run may backfire
in the long run, insulating them from the Red Queen process
and so rendering them less competitive as a result. Conse-
quently, the answer to the question “Why are some organiza-
tions stronger competitors?” hinges on which logic of com-
petition guides one’s analysis. Our purpose in this study is to
show that this difference is important theoretically and to
demonstrate this difference empirically in a study of the glo-
bal hard disk drive market.
TWO LOGICS OF DYNAMIC COMPETITION
Many theories include some logic of competition among
organizations. Two such logics appear across various organi-
zationally focused treatments of the subject and are interest-
ing because they have very different dynamic implications.
Some theories depict competition as a race or contest
among organizations that strive to surpass one another in dif-
ferent ways. These theories emphasize that in any given
organizational context, ongoing changes in products, ser-
vices, and technologies are typical and often are the means
through which organizations compete. By contrast, other the-
ories conceive of competition as a constraint on organiza-
tions, such as when price competition disciplines an organiza-
tion to lower costs or improve quality at a given cost. Each of
these logics has dynamic implications for organizational size.
Competition as Contest
Several theories conceive of competition among organiza-
tions, at least implicitly, as a race-like contest in which organi-
zations are rewarded for remaining up to date, often with ref-
erence to technology or product-development races. Perhaps
the earliest theoretical treatment of such competition comes
from evolutionary economics, which elaborates a rational-
choice approach to this dynamic problem. The challenge from
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an evolutionary-economics perspective is to understand the
incentive properties of the contest: Is it rational to invest in
being first? Schumpeter’s (1934, 1950) often-cited answer is
that competition renders investments in innovation irrational,
unless by being first one can enjoy a period of monopoly-like
returns that (may) make innovation pay off (referred to as
“entrepreneurial rents”). As Nelson and Winter (1982) noted,
an organization in a permanent monopoly position would not
have an incentive to disturb this status quo by innovating—
the so-called “lazy monopolist” problem (see also Jewkes,
Sawers, and Stillerman, 1969; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982).
Similarly, political analyses of organizational behavior reveal
that internal organizational politics might rationally lead orga-
nizations to resist innovation (see Schön, 1967; Zald, 1970;
Frost and Egri, 1991). But as long as competition is likely to
materialize eventually (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985), Schum-
peter’s story holds in that the promise of a temporary monop-
oly provides an incentive to invest in risky innovation.
Because such a monopoly position typically corresponds to
larger organizational size, the implication is that size
enhances an organization’s chances of racing well.
Tempering the Schumpeterian hypothesis, other researchers
have argued or demonstrated that (typically large) incumbent
organizations sometimes resist radical technological changes,
preferring instead to engage in innovations that build on the
status quo (Menzel, 1960; Normann, 1971; Tushman and
Anderson, 1986; Dosi, 1988; Henderson and Clark, 1990;
Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; Christensen and Bower, 1996).
In some instances, radical technological innovations require
fundamental organizational-structural transformations, which
in turn are likely to be resisted, especially in large, complex
organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Carroll and Teo,
1996; D’Aunno, Tucci, and Alexander, 2000; Hannan, Pólos,
and Carroll, 2003a, 2003b). Keeping in mind the problem of
structural inertia, then, suggests that the role of organization-
al size in technological races depends on whether the
changes build on the status quo: with the exception of radical
changes that destroy incumbent advantages, large organiza-
tions tend to race well along established, programmatic tech-
nological trajectories.
Schumpeter’s argument has motivated much of the empirical
literature on technology diffusion, in which early adoption of a
technology is claimed to provide larger benefits than later
adoption, among survivors, that is (see Mansfield, 1961,
1968; Rogers, 1995). Some of the studies in this vein look at
the global disk drive industry, using part of the data we ana-
lyze here. Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback (1998) found
that disk drive manufacturers are more likely to survive if
they remain up to date technologically. Lerner’s (1997) disk
drive study showed that organizations running just behind the
technological leader have been most likely to move up in the
race, reinforcing the importance of the technological-contest
perspective in this industry. Regarding organizational size,
Lerner found that larger disk drive manufacturers are espe-
cially likely to adopt new technologies, a finding consistent
with Schumpeter’s ideas and with other work in the technol-
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ogy diffusion literature (see Mansfield, 1963a; Rogers, 1995;
Swamidass, 2003).
Various other theories have focused on differences among
organizations in their ability to innovate (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990; Iansiti and Clark, 1994; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen,
1997). The classic rendering of this argument also is by
Schumpeter (1950), who argued that large organizations have
the capability to bring new ideas to market and the long-term
time horizons to make this rational. Investigating this claim,
Mansfield (1963b) found that the largest firms are most likely
to account for a large part of an industry’s successful innova-
tions. Nelson and Winter (1982) added the possibility that
organizations may come to routinize the innovation process
and, in so doing, rationalize the timing of relatively rapid prod-
uct introductions. They concluded that this rationalization
favors large firms (see also Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Klepper
and Simons, 2000). Similarly, Galbraith (1967) argued that
large organizations were the innovative engines in the U.S.
economy during much of the twentieth century because
these organizations were able to manage the innovation
process. Chandler (1962) emphasized the structural advan-
tages of large organizations as engines of innovation, in argu-
ments that drew on the Carnegie School (Barnard, 1948;
Simon, 1945), which depicted complex organizations as espe-
cially effective mechanisms for coordinating and controlling
activities entailing multiple time horizons. Cyert and March
(1963) noted that with increasing size, organizations were
able to build into their procedures mechanisms for innovation
and improvement. More recently, empirical research supports
this idea, finding that larger organizations are more likely to
make relatively programmatic changes of many kinds (Have-
man, 1992, 1993; Minkoff, 1999; Greve, 1999; Haveman and
Nonnemaker, 2000; Sørensen and Stuart, 2000; Palmer and
Barber, 2001; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Khessina, 2002;
Chuang and Baum, 2003). Overall, the picture painted by
these various literatures features large organizations as par-
ticularly adept at adaptive change in technology and product
races, at least when the changes involved are incremental or
programmed (Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman, 1969; Aber-
nathy and Utterback, 1978).
Similar arguments on the advantage of large scale also fea-
ture prominently in the international business literature. Glob-
alization has been viewed as an outcome of oligopolistic
competition, whereby the largest firms in concentrated indus-
tries drive foreign investment through a follow-the-leader
process (Knickerbocker, 1973; Yu and Ito, 1988; Li and
Guisinger, 1992). Such competition is seen as the norm
across industries and is reflected in international business
textbooks (Vernon, Wells, and Rangan, 1996: 55). The leading
theories in international business similarly underscore the
advantages of scale in global competition. Dunning’s (1993)
“eclectic theory” of the multinational corporation (MNC), for
example, emphasizes that MNCs require certain “ownership
advantages” over purely domestic firms to stay ahead in
global markets (see also Hymer, 1960). In addition to its
intangible assets, the scale at which an MNC operates is a
central ownership advantage and provides economies in
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sourcing, production, research and development (R&D),
advertising, and administration. Both Porter’s (1990) analysis
of how firms sustain advantages in international competition
and Chandler’s (1990) comparative history of the expansion
of the modern corporation comport with this view.
The racing metaphor is widely used in analyses of global
competition. Time-to-market pressures are severe in a range
of global industries, including semiconductors, hard disk
drives, and some segments of the clothing industry (Aber-
nathy et al., 1999; McKendrick, Doner, and Haggard, 2000;
Leachman and Leachman, 2004). Faster cycle times also
affect the R&D strategies of global firms. In a number of
industrial contexts, evolutions in product and process tech-
nologies are occurring at such a rapid pace that many firms
have established foreign R&D sites to accelerate the genera-
tion and acquisition of new knowledge (Kummerle, 1999;
Murtha, Lenway, and Hart, 2001; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002).
Others have emphasized the benefits to moving early in
establishing an international network, which can lead to repu-
tation, scale, and learning advantages. Firms that move quick-
ly into new segments can displace international leaders that
are slow to exploit the structural changes (e.g., Porter, 1990).
In sum, there is widespread consensus that large organiza-
tions with global reach are thereby advantaged when compe-
tition takes on the qualities of a technology or product race.
From Competitive Constraints to the Red Queen
Sociological theories typically regard competition not so
much as a race as a powerful constraint operating on organi-
zations. Following Thompson (1967), resource dependence
theory places special emphasis on competition as a primary
source of uncertainty that constrains organizations, their
structures, and their actions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
More recent organization theories make reference to Simmel
(1955), whose observation that competition constrains actors
to work toward the benefit of others forms the basis of eco-
logical and network theories of competition alike (Hannan and
Freeman, 1989; Burt, 1992). In organizational ecology, com-
petition is thought to play an especially important role in
selecting for or against various forms of organizations
depending on whether they conform to environmental
requirements, both technical and institutional (Carroll and
Hannan, 2000). The related variation-selection-retention
framework also portrays competition as a constraining force
driving selection among organizations (Aldrich, 1999).
Research on network structures among organizations, simi-
larly, regards competition as a primary constraint shaping the
actions and fates of organizations (Burt, 1987).
Global competition also can be understood as a constraint,
one that is shaped by powerful institutional forces (Ghoshal
and Westney, 1993). While the behaviors and structures of
firms generally reflect the practices and business models of
their home markets, firms engaged in global competition are
subject to quite different institutional environments (Rosen-
zweig and Singh, 1991; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). All states
influence firm behaviors through coercive and normative
pressures, but states vary in their policies toward competi-
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tion, labor markets, corporate governance, and the like (Lind-
blom, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio, 1990;
Westney, 1993; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Thus, states consti-
tute powerful institutional agents shaping how global compe-
tition affects firms.
By and large, research has examined competitive constraints
as a force to be reckoned with at a given point in time. But
what happens, over time, when an organization responds to
competitive constraints? This response, in turn, represents a
further constraint on the organization’s rivals; in fact, a defin-
ing characteristic of competition is that one organization’s
solution becomes its rivals’ problem. The resulting increased
constraints, again in turn, are likely to trigger responses
among rivals, again intensifying competitive constraints on
the first organization, and so on. This escalating system of
reciprocal causality, dubbed “Red Queen” competition by the
biologist Van Valen (1973), has been found to strongly affect
rates of founding, growth, and failure among organizations
(Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Barnett and Sorenson, 2002).1
Our aim here is to see how organizations shape this coevolu-
tionary process in unintended ways as they become large
and strategically formidable.
Among organizations, Red Queen evolution can come about
both through organizational learning and by natural selection.
To consider the role played by organizational learning, we
build on the model developed by March and his colleagues
(March, 1988, 1994) and several of the basic assumptions in
that model. First, assume that people in organizations “satis-
fice” when confronted with the need to make decisions
(March and Simon, 1958). A so-called problemistic search for
alternatives is triggered when performance falls below some
aspiration level and is continued until performance is consid-
ered satisfactory (Cyert and March, 1963). This search pro-
ceeds sequentially, presumably, stopping at the first satisfac-
tory solution, rather than continuing until the best possible
solution is found. Search also is assumed to remain “local,”
restricted to solutions that are only incrementally different
from current practice, and only moving to more distant possi-
ble solutions when no satisfactory local solutions are found
(Levinthal and March, 1981). In this search process, learning
through imitation might also occur (Mezias and Lant, 1994).
By these assumptions, organizations adapt incrementally in
an effort to maintain at least a minimum, satisfactory level of
performance.
Now consider a population of competing organizations, each
behaving according to the satisficing model. In this context,
the organization-learning process does not end once a given
organization improves its performance by adopting some
new practice. Instead, the innovating organization, by improv-
ing its own performance, now has increased the intensity of
competition felt by the other organizations in the population.
At some point, this increased competitive intensity may
reduce performance in other organizations enough to trigger
search in these organizations. As each of these organizations
finds solutions that restore its performance, in turn, competi-
tion again increases for the rest of the population, again trig-
gering the search for improvements. So learning and compe-
1
In an influential article, Van Valen (1973)
invoked the Red Queen metaphor to
describe the coevolutionary process in
which viability and competitiveness each
strengthen the other. Stronger competi-
tors increase selection pressures, yielding
more fit survivors, which in turn generate
stronger competition and so on in a self-
accelerating process of reciprocal causali-
ty. The Red Queen refers to a character
from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking
Glass, to whom Alice comments that
although Alice is running, she does not
appear to be moving. The Red Queen
responds that in a fast-moving world “it
takes all the running you can do, to keep
in the same place.” As this image sug-
gests, the relative positions of players in
Red Queen competition may be stable,
even though the race is producing
absolute change for the system as a
whole.
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tition are linked causally, each accelerating the other in the
ongoing process of Red Queen evolution.
In addition, aspiration levels might in fact change endoge-
nously as part of Red Queen evolution. We know that aspira-
tion levels among individuals adjust rapidly (Lant, 1992) and
that often they are defined by social comparison in competi-
tions that hinge on the relative positions of players (Herriott,
Levinthal, and March, 1985; Frank and Cook, 1995). If organi-
zational aspiration levels are influenced by comparisons with
their competitors, as is often the case, then we might see
aspirations ratcheting upward among organizations involved
in Red Queen evolution. In this way, making aspiration levels
endogenous is likely to maintain the process of Red Queen
evolution over time.
Red Queen evolution can also result purely through natural
selection among organizations. Assume that organizations
differ with respect to their fitnesses and that these differ-
ences remained fixed over time. Assume also that competi-
tion culls from organizations according to these fitness levels,
so that as competition intensifies, the less fit organizations
are selected out (see Levinthal, 1997). Among surviving orga-
nizations, then, those that have faced very little prior compe-
tition would include both fit and unfit organizations. By con-
trast, fitness levels will generally be higher among
organizations that have survived considerable prior competi-
tion. Both through selection and learning, then, the process
of Red Queen evolution implies that organizations are both
more viable, and more competitive, the more that they have
faced competition in the past.
The relative stability of players in Red Queen evolution
results from the mutually reinforcing increases in each orga-
nization’s viability and the potency of each organization’s
rivals. Our model of Red Queen evolution separates the two
parts of this dynamic, distinguishing between the organiza-
tional and the ecological implications of exposure to competi-
tion (see Barnett, 1997):
rj(t) = rj(t)*exp[Ej + (Σk≠jEk)],
where rj(t) is the failure rate for organization j; rj(t)* is j’s base-
line failure rate as a function of its age t, its current competi-
tive context, and other observables;  and  are coefficients
to be estimated; and E refers to the cumulative prior expo-
sure to competition of organization j or its current rivals k,
measured in organization-years so that, for instance, if organi-
zation j competed with four rivals during each of its first and
second years of life, it would have a value of Ej = 8 during its
third year of life. If prior exposure to competition increases
organizational viability, as implied by Red Queen evolution,
then we can expect  < 0. Meanwhile, the ecological conse-
quences of Red Queen evolution materialize if  > 0, where
j’s rivals’ prior exposure to competition increases their com-
petitive strength. Whether the twin consequences of Red
Queen evolution are offsetting, then, is treated by our model
as an empirical question that depends on the exact magni-
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tudes of  and  as well as the observed values of E for any
given organization and its rivals.
Organizational Size and Red Queen Evolution
Thus far we have assumed that an organization responds to
competitive constraints by searching for improvements, but
for large organizations there is an alternative to the ongoing
process of Red Queen evolution. Organizations that have
attained positional advantage—market position, social pres-
tige, centrality in social networks, political power, and the
like—may attenuate or even eliminate the threat of competi-
tion from others. In fact, the modern field of strategic man-
agement in business education exists primarily to investigate
and teach methods for finding safety from the forces of com-
petition, stimulated in large part by Porter’s (1980) application
of industrial organization economics to the problem of com-
petitive constraints. In sociology, similar ideas appear in
Selznick’s (1949) early work on cooptation, featuring large
organizations of political importance that absorb interests and
avert threats. More recently, researchers have found large
organizations to be especially capable of staking out and
defending their strategic position (Haveman, 1993; Barnett,
Greve, and Park, 1994) and of maintaining interlocks with
other important actors (Kono et al., 1998). Yet precisely
because large organizations are capable of averting competi-
tive constraints, they may be less susceptible to the Red
Queen process.
When faced, nonetheless, with competitive constraints, large
organizations also have distinct advantages in coping with
these pressures. Large organizations typically buffer key
parts of the organization from the external environment,
especially when they face complex and changing environ-
ments (Thompson, 1967; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In light
of Red Queen evolution, this ability implies that key parts of
large organizations may remain insulated from competitive
threats and so may not recognize the imperative for change.
Small organizations, by contrast, typically are less able to
insulate themselves from competitive threats. Theory and
evidence also show that larger organizations are more capa-
ble of decoupling key activities from environmental pres-
sures, especially competition (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfef-
fer and Salancik, 1978), while small organizations are known
to exhibit tight linking between environmental pressures and
internal processes (Hickson, Pugh, and Pheysey, 1969).
Moreover, large organizations often experience an increasing
isolation of their leadership (Michels, 1949; Gusfield, 1957)
and throughout their rank and file see a smaller proportion of
organizational members having contact with the external
environment (Blau, 1977). Overall, large organizations are less
directly affected by competition (Barron, 1999; Bothner,
2003) and so are less likely to conform to the predictions of
the Red Queen model.
Even when affected by competitive threats, however, large
organizations are likely to be less responsive than are small
organizations. As Hannan and Freeman (1984) argued in their
theory of structural inertia, with size come pressures for reli-
able behavior. Leadership in large organizations tends to
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become less immediately responsive to external demands
over time because of increased formalization and rule-gov-
erned behavior (Weber, 1946; Bendix, 1956). Consequently,
large organizations typically are designed to behave according
to established routines, continuing to behave in expected
ways rather than responding sensitively to performance feed-
back (Greve, 2003). Furthermore, when adjustment to perfor-
mance feedback does occur, such adjustment is likely to be
less profound than in small organizations. Change in a small
organization entails obtaining cooperation from a smaller
number of people, groups, and other organizational units.
Large organizations, by contrast, are likely to require coopera-
tion from proportionately more parties. Moreover, large orga-
nizations are typically more complex than small organizations,
and with increasing complexity comes an exponential
increase in the numbers of ways that changes can be
blocked (Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2003a, 2003b). Again,
these arguments point to large organizations being less
responsive to the Red Queen process.
Finally, size per se often gives organizations technical advan-
tages that can help them weather competitive constraints. In
general, it is well known that larger organizations are less
likely to fail, other things being equal (Carroll and Hannan,
2000; McKendrick et al., 2003). This may result from many
advantages of size, including the tendency for larger organiza-
tions to behave more reliably (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002).
Large organizations enjoy cost advantages in many indus-
tries, in which case competition favors larger organizations
over smaller organizations when they occupy the same niche
(Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Dobrev, Kim, and Carroll,
2002). In this light, it is not surprising that density-dependent
competition has been found to have a considerably weaker
effect on organizations as they grow large (Barron, 1999).
Institutional advantages also help large organizations to main-
tain themselves despite market pressures. Meyer and Rowan
(1977) noted the survival-enhancing legitimacy of organiza-
tional practices regardless of their market efficiency, especial-
ly as organizations become large and complex. DiMaggio and
Powell (1983) regarded this idea as central to two kinds of
isomorphism, observing that large organizations benefit oth-
ers because of their legitimacy. Large organizations also are
advantaged in dealing with competition due to their typically
higher social status. In general, high social status eases pres-
sures for conformity that affect lower-status actors (Phillips
and Zuckerman, 2001; Rao, Greve, and Davis, 2001; Zucker-
man et al., 2003; Bothner, 2003). Relatively high social status
is known to help large organizations cope with competition
(Podolny, 1993).
As organizations grow large, we therefore expect that they
will become less disciplined by competition, and so less sus-
ceptible to the forces of Red Queen evolution. These argu-
ments apply both to the learning and the selection compo-
nents of our theory. Confronted by weaker competitive
discipline, large organizations are less likely to be stimulated
to search for solutions. Similarly, competition generates
selection processes that are more likely to eliminate small
organizations from the population if they fail to improve.
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Large organizations, by contrast, enjoy advantages that make
it more likely that they will continue to survive despite their
failure to respond to competition. So natural selection reason-
ing also suggests that large organizations will be less respon-
sive to the stimulus of competition and consequently less
likely to conform to the predictions of the Red Queen model.
Operationally, these ideas imply a Red Queen model with
separate parameters for large and small organizations:
rj(t) = rj(t)*exp [SESj + LELk + S(ΣSk≠jESk) + L(ΣLk≠jELk)],
where ESj refers to organization j’s prior competition experi-
enced at times when it was a small organization, and ELj is
j’s prior competitive experience during times when it was a
large organization. Similarly, ESk and ELk represent the prior
competitive experience of j’s rivals k, distinguishing between
competition experienced when these rivals were small or
large organizations, respectively. If we are correct that organi-
zations limit the Red Queen process as they attain the power
and stature that come with size, then we should see evi-
dence of Red Queen evolution among small organizations
more strongly than among large organizations. In terms of
our model, this would imply:
Hypothesis 1: S < 0 and S < L, such that prior exposure to com-
petition when an organization is small reduces its failure rate more
than does prior exposure to competition when an organization is
large.
Hypothesis 2: S > 0 and S > L, such that a rival’s exposure to
competition increases the strength of its rivalry, especially when this
exposure happens to a small rival organization.
To summarize, theories of competition that follow a racing
logic highlight the strengths of large organizations, especially
in contexts like the hard disk drive market, in which techno-
logical change is ongoing and relatively programmatic and
global reach is especially important. Conceiving of competi-
tion as a constraint, by contrast, focuses our attention on the
dynamics of Red Queen competition. Following this logic, the
very strengths that make larger organizations able to manage
constraints also make them less susceptible to the survival-
and competitiveness-enhancing consequences of the Red
Queen process. Overall, then, we expect to see large organi-
zations do well when it comes to keeping up in the hard disk
drive technology race but to be less enhanced by exposure
to competition than are their smaller rivals. In global competi-
tion, however, Red Queen evolution implies more complex
dynamics.
Global Competition and Red Queen Evolution
Several scholars have argued that when firms from different
countries compete, cross-national differences among organi-
zations become apparent, differences that remain unnoticed
when firms remain confined within the boundaries of domes-
tic markets (Anand and Kogut, 1997). The national context—
including people and their expertise, culture, social struc-
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tures, industrial networks, and political and market institu-
tions—arguably creates similarities in the strengths and
weaknesses shared by organizations from the same country
(Porter, 1990; Kogut, 1992; Nelson, 1993). Some have specu-
lated that such cross-national differences might account for
much of the observed worldwide variations we see in the
viability of firms (Chandler, 1990), and Chesbrough (1999) has
found such differences to be important in the hard disk drive
market.
Along these lines, and pertinent to our model, is Porter’s
(1990) idea that competitive experiences in one’s home coun-
try translate into stronger global competition (see also Porter
and Sakakibara, 2001). This possibility can be treated as an
extension of our model to the context of global competition.
If SF and LF represent the competition generated by small
and large foreign rivals, respectively, as a function of their
own domestic competitive experience, then we would
expect:
Hypothesis 3: SF > 0 and SF > LF, indicating that a foreign rival’s
exposure to domestic competition in its home country increases the
strength of its global competitiveness, especially when this expo-
sure happens to a small foreign rival.
Alternatively, national differences in the competition generat-
ed by firms could increase over time among all firms, concur-
rent with larger trends in the globalization of markets. While
global competition may initially reflect firms’ national charac-
teristics, over time, as competition increases, capabilities and
behaviors among firms may converge, thereby diminishing
national differences (McKendrick, 2001). To allow for this pos-
sibility, we build into our model an alternative formulation of
globalization by distinguishing whether an organization’s rivals
are foreign or domestic (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). At
one extreme, if a firm’s domestic rivals generate very strong
competition while potential rivals from other countries gener-
ate none, then market competition can be seen as strictly
domestic. At the other extreme, if the strength of competi-
tion generated by both domestic and foreign-based rivals is
equally strong, then competition can be regarded as global.
At any point in time, the observed pattern of competition in
an industry could be described as more or less global
depending on how much it resembles one of these two
extreme cases. It is possible that competition becomes more
global for all organizations over time, regardless of exposure
to competition, as markets develop (see Hannan, 1997). In
our model, we investigate this possibility as an alternative to
hypothesis 3.
METHOD
We investigated our ideas by estimating ecological models of
competition on data describing all manufacturers of hard disk
drives. Our data are more comprehensive than those ana-
lyzed in the prior research on the industry by Lerner (1997),
Christensen (1997), Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback
(1998), Chesbrough (1999), and King and Tucci (2002). While
their data are left-censored (using market research reports
that began in 1977), ours cover the entire organizational pop-
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ulation dating back to the beginning of the industry in 1956.
The Appendix provides details on our data and data-collection
methods. The hard disk drive market, described in figures 1
and 2 and table 1, is an ideal setting for our study. The defin-
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Figure 2. Entries and exits of hard disk drive manufacturers worldwide.
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Figure 1. Hard disk drive manufacturers by home region.
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ing characteristic of competition in the industry has been the
ongoing race to deliver higher storage capacities on ever-
smaller devices at less cost and in less time (McKendrick,
Doner, and Haggard, 2000).
Moreover, the industry has become increasingly globalized,
both in terms of the nationality of the firms and in the locus
of competition. Initially, most countries’ hard disk drive mar-
kets were predominately domestic, with domestic computer
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) purchasing from
domestic hard disk drive firms. Japanese organizations
entered the hard disk drive market seven years after the
U.S., and Europe twelve years after. Brazilian, Taiwanese, and
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Table 1
Description of Disk Drive Manufacturers Worldwide 1956–1998 (N = 171)
1956 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
No. of organizations 1 2 8 29 35 49 86
No. of large organizations 0 1 3 4 12 40 47
—No. in med. or high capacity 0 0 2 3 7 29 37
—% in med. or high capacity 0 0 .67 .75 .58 .73 .79
No. of small organizations 1 1 5 25 23 9 39
—No. in med. or high capacity 0 1 2 14 6 7 18
—% in med. or high capacity 0 1.0 .40 56 .26 .78 .46
No. of de novo organizations 0 0 1 7 5 10 27
No. of de alio organizations 1 2 7 22 30 39 59
No. of captive producers 1 1 5 15 19 24 26
No. of orgs. manuf. in Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
No. of organizations producing for sale*:
—1.8-inch form factor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
—2.5-inch form factor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
—3.5-inch form factor 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
—5.25-inch form factor 0 0 0 0 0 2 55
—8-inch form factor 0 0 0 0 0 16 20
—14-inch form factor 0 0 2 20 26 32 21
—24-inch form factor 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
—39-inch form factor 0 1 3 1 0 0 0
Over all years
1990 1995 1998 Min. Max. Mean S.D.
No. of organizations 72 30 20 1 86 35.76 27.22
No. of large organizations 28 14 11 0 55 17.95 17.23
—No. in med. or high capacity 23 13 9
—% in med. or high capacity .82 .93 .82
No. of small organizations 44 16 9 0 49 17.81 14.36
—No. in med. or high capacity 18 10 4
—% in med. or high capacity .41 .63 .44
No. of de novo organizations 25 15 10 0 28 10.27 9.49
No. of de alio organizations 47 15 10 1 59 25.48 18.60
No. of captive producers 21 7 6 1 29 13.40 9.14
No. of orgs. manuf. in Asia 14 16 16 0 17 4.53 6.36
No. of organizations producing for sale*:
—1.8-inch form factor 0 6 2 0 9 .86 2.16
—2.5-inch form factor 6 16 7 0 16 2.48 4.92
—3.5-inch form factor 40 20 15 0 40 8.76 13.29
—5.25-inch form factor 29 8 4 0 55 12.30 18.54
—8-inch form factor 13 2 0 0 27 5.81 8.78
—14-inch form factor 11 0 0 0 33 12.93 12.58
—24-inch form factor 0 0 0 0 2 .18 .50
—39-inch form factor 0 0 0 0 3 .51 .93
* These include only “non-captive” product offerings produced for sale. In some years, a relatively small number of
organizations produced only “captively” for their own use, in which case these non-captive offerings do not sum to the
total number of organizations.
Korean companies followed in the early and mid-1980s.
Although American firms aggressively marketed drives world-
wide early on, most firms kept their primary focus on domes-
tic markets. Perhaps for this reason, organizations in the
industry often are identified according to their country of ori-
gin, and country factors have been found to be important to
the formation of hard disk drive manufacturers (Chesbrough,
1999).
As time passed, however, the hard disk drive market became
increasingly global. A watershed event in the computer
industry was the debut of the IBM personal computer (PC) in
1981. The PC defined the dominant design in the microcom-
puter market for many years (Langlois, 1992; Anderson,
1995). In addition to setting the standard for what a desktop
computer should include, it featured an open architecture
that attracted the entry not only of some of IBM’s estab-
lished mainframe and minicomputer rivals but de novo start-
ups that set out to manufacture IBM “clones.” The same
open architecture that attracted the new clone manufacturers
also stimulated entry into peripheral equipment. While main-
frame and minicomputer manufacturers made many of their
own peripherals and components, the assemblers of person-
al computers outsourced almost all of their production.
Competition as Contest in the Hard Disk Drive Market
Technological leadership in the hard disk drive market has
been based on a firm’s ability to deliver higher-capacity disk
drives. Capacity is determined by how many bits can be
stored on a square inch of disk, otherwise known as the
drive’s areal density. Since IBM shipped the first movable-
head disk drive in 1956, the industry has undergone tremen-
dous technological change. Until 1991, areal density
increased at an annual rate of 30 percent but grew by an
astounding 60 percent per year from 1992 to 1997, a faster
rate of progress than semiconductors, and an amazing 125
percent in 1998, our last year of study. The average rate of
capacity increase was 30–40 percent each year between
1956 and 1991.
Rapid technological change has allowed the market to devel-
op into roughly three segments. One segment is composed
of firms that offer the highest capacity drives. A second seg-
ment consists of firms that are the early leaders into a
“capacity point” in demand by the largest computer manu-
facturers, which typically excludes the highest capacity
drives. The third segment encompasses the technological
laggards that serve the secondary market of second-tier
mainframe and minicomputer makers and the hundreds of
small and medium-sized microcomputer companies. Firms
late to market with a new drive thus suffer a severe revenue
penalty: if too late, they may find no customers and be
forced either to absorb their development costs and start
developing an even higher-capacity drive or to exit the indus-
try. Even so, first-to-market innovators typically hold only the
slimmest of leads, as other manufacturers generally intro-
duce comparable products within a relatively short time. The
likelihood of rapidly decreasing profitability over the life cycle
of any given product provides a strong incentive for firms to
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innovate rapidly. But the result is extremely short product
cycles, estimated in 2003 to be from six to nine months.
Most firms have had trouble keeping up with such continu-
ous product introductions.
Not only have firms needed to keep up with changes in
capacity, they have needed to keep pace with the reductions
in the physical size of hard disk drives, from using disks with
diameters of 39, 31, and 24 inches to 14-, 8-, 5.25-, 3.5-, and
2.5-inch drives. These changes in “form factor” have proven
problematic for many drive manufacturers, and most firms
have not survived the transition. For some firms, the inability
to introduce smaller form factors was due to technological
reasons: scaling down components and getting designs to
work properly were engineering challenges. In other cases,
as Christensen (1997) has pointed out, new form factors
sometimes served new markets, and managers of many
incumbent firms were slow to recognize the necessity of
change.
As if these technological and marketing challenges are not
daunting enough, firms also have had to achieve economies
of scale in order to compete effectively on price. While being
first to market was in many ways critical, first-to-volume pro-
duction has often been more important. Many new entrants
have been among the first to introduce a particular form fac-
tor or hit the highest capacity point. But computer vendors
seldom gave a second chance to firms that were unable to
ramp up to volume production effectively. As a result, sur-
vival in the disk drive industry has increasingly required the
marriage of technological prowess to manufacturing ability.
The volatility of this organizational population has limited the
ability of market leaders to control pricing or the length of
product life cycles. Periodic oversupply and constant price
erosion are ways of life for disk drive producers. Disk drive
manufacturers might attempt to avoid the pitfalls of the price-
sensitive, high-volume, low end of the market by differentiat-
ing their products into higher-capacity segments, such as
drives for file servers and network storage. But ongoing inno-
vation has made it impossible for firms to sustain a product
differentiation strategy for long periods. In this context, then,
racing well as technologies advance has been crucial to orga-
nizational success. As the pattern in table 1 shows, large
organizations have maintained, over most of the industry’s
history, a clear advantage in terms of the proportion of orga-
nizations producing in the medium- to high-capacity ranges.
Consistent with Lerner’s (1997) analysis of this industry, our
data show that larger organizations hold a clear competitive
advantage, at least when we conceive of competition as a
contest for being technologically up to date.
Model Specification and Estimation
We used the modeling framework of organizational ecology
to build our model of Red Queen competition because this
approach allows for explicit estimation of competition among
organizations. In particular, the so-called density-dependent
model allows each organization’s viability to vary as a func-
tion of the number, or density, of other organizations in the
population (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Failure rates are
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thought to be non-monotonically related to density, falling
with initial increases in density as legitimacy increases but
ultimately increasing as competitive effects grow with crowd-
ing in the population (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Hannan
and Carroll, 1992). Furthermore, persistently higher failure
rates are found for organizations facing greater density at the
time of their birth, the so-called density-delay effect attrib-
uted to problems caused by building an organization under
adverse conditions (Carroll and Hannan, 1989). Our model
includes these various density effects. For our purposes, the
effects of disaggregated and weighted densities are also esti-
mated, because these allow for competition to depend on
both technological and geographic factors.
The hard disk drive market’s history of technological differen-
tiation suggests that we should operationalize density using
technology-overlap measures (see Carroll and Hannan, 2000).
These overlap measures equal density counts if all organiza-
tions compete in all technological areas. For any of j’s rivals
that overlap j’s technological domain only partially, however,
they contribute to j’s overlap score only in proportion to their
degree of overlap. We specified the possible technological
domain of each organization j to include relatively low-, medi-
um-, and high-capacity positions in each of the various form
factors of hard disk drives that existed in a given year. We
defined these relative levels to account for changes over
time in absolute capacity, as explained in the Appendix. For
each firm in each year, we disaggregated the raw count of its
rivals into technology-overlap and non-overlap densities. If
competition in the industry was technologically segmented,
as we suspect, then failure rates will be driven especially by
overlap density as opposed to non-overlap density.
Implementing our model of the Red Queen, we tested for
the survival implications of each organization j’s prior expo-
sure to competition. For each organization in each year t, we
measured the sum of its domestic technology-overlap densi-
ty score in each previous year from its birth through year t-1.
If prior exposure to competition enhanced survival chances,
as we argue, then this variable should reduce exit rates,
especially among small organizations.
Each organization’s technology mix was measured using vari-
ables that sum the number of form factors (of different rela-
tive capacity levels) in which the firm had product offerings.
For example, a firm with low-capacity product offerings in
three different form factors would have a measure of 3 for
“number of low-capacity form factors produced.” If this firm
also produced medium-capacity products in four form factors
and high-capacity products in one form factor, then it would
also have a measure of 5 for “number of medium- and high-
capacity form factors produced.” These variables allowed us
to investigate whether and how being relatively ahead or
behind in the technology race affected survival rates.
Our main measure of organizational size is a categorical mea-
sure that distinguishes between large and small firms,
defined relatively for each year, and updated from year to
year. For years prior to 1976, this designation was made by
examining historical documents to identify major players in
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the industry in each year. For observations after 1976, we
relied on the data source Disk/Trend.
Two kinds of control variables were also included in our spec-
ification. One set of variables allows the “carrying capacity”
for hard disk drive manufacturers to vary over time, by
region, and by technologies. We included, for each firm, the
number of computer manufacturers in the United States that
made a computer corresponding to a form factor produced
by the hard disk drive firm. The data on computer OEMs
come from various sources, as described in Barnett, Swan-
son, and Sorenson (2003). This variable reflects the market
for a given firm’s disk drives and so can capture symbiosis
between these complementary parts of the organizational
community. Calendar year was included to control for secular
trends in the carrying capacity not otherwise captured in our
specification. Indicator variables were included measuring
whether or not a given organization in a given year was pro-
ducing in a given form factor. Because organizations could be
in any or all form factors at once, there is no omitted catego-
ry among these indicators. Also, indicator variables were
included for the region of the global economy in which each
organization was headquartered, with North America serving
as the omitted category. This approach allowed us to investi-
gate whether our hypothesized effects account for national
differences in failure rates.
Also included were some other organization-level control vari-
ables. Along with our large/small categorical measure of size,
we included a measure of size in terms of the dollar value of
hard disk drive sales, but this measure was available only for
large organizations and only after 1976. An indicator variable,
allowed to vary from year to year for each firm, was included
for firms engaged in any so-called “captive” production of
disk drives for their own computers. Another indicator vari-
able represented whether an organization (from any country)
was manufacturing disk drives in Asian facilities in a given
year, a low-cost production strategy pursued by selected
firms (McKendrick, Doner, and Haggard, 2000). Following
Carroll et al. (1996), we also included an indicator variable to
distinguish between de novo firms, those that entered the
industry as a start-up, and de alio entrants, who moved or
expanded into the industry from some other industry. Table 2
describes our pooled annual observations over the period of
the study.
We modeled the failure rate using a piecewise-exponential
specification for each organization’s market tenure and esti-
mated the model using the software package STATA. This is
an extremely flexible specification that allows failure rates to
change freely from period to period. We selected periods to
be as fine grained as possible while not being so short as to
prevent the estimation of statistically meaningful effects.
Although many studies have measured t in terms of organiza-
tional age, we measured t in terms of market tenure. For de
novo firms that were born as hard disk drive manufacturers,
age and tenure are the same. Firms with operations in other
markets, however, may have been born before they entered
the hard disk drive market. In these cases, market tenure dif-
fers from organizational age, and we used tenure rather than
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age in our analysis. We also allowed for the possibility that
the effects of industry tenure depend on organizational size
(Carroll and Hannan, 2000) by estimating separate tenure
effects for large and small organizations.
RESULTS
Tables 3a and 3b show estimates of baseline failure rate
models that include the various control variables and different
specifications of the density of organizations. For compari-
son, model 1 includes the control variables but no density
variables. Model 2 then includes density in the year of an
organization’s founding and a quadratic specification of con-
temporaneous density. None of these density effects are sta-
tistically significant, nor in model 3 does density have a sta-
tistically significant effect when specified without the
squared and density-at-birth terms. In model 4, however,
strong competitive results appear when worldwide density is
disaggregated to distinguish the effects of domestic and for-
eign rivals, as well as different effects for domestic rivals that
overlap in product space and those that do not. These disag-
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Table 2
Description of Pooled Annual Observations of Disk Drive Manufacturers Worldwide, 1956–1998*
Variable
Organization’s market tenure
Calendar year (1956 = 0)
Number of low-capacity form factors produced by organization
Number of medium- and high-capacity form factors produced
by organization
Hard-drive sales ($mil) by organization (large only)
Number of computer manufacturers in the form factors
produced by organization
Entries of computer manufacturers in the form factors
produced by organization
Number of rivals worldwide in year of organization’s founding
Number of rivals worldwide
(Number of rivals worldwide)2/1000
Number of domestic rivals
Overlap with domestic rivals (by form factor and capacity)
Overlap with small domestic rivals (by form factor and
capacity)
Overlap with large domestic rivals (by form factor and capacity)
Non-overlap with domestic rivals
Organization’s competitive experience
Small organization’s competitive experience
Large organization’s competitive experience
Rivals’ competitive experience, same region (experience-
weighted overlap)
Small rivals’ competitive experience, same region (experience-
weighted overlap)
Large rivals’ competitive experience, same region (experience-
weighted overlap)
Overlap with domestic rivals times calendar year (1956 = 0)
Number of foreign rivals
Overlap with foreign rivals (by form factor and capacity)
Foreign rivals’ competitive experience (experience-weighted
overlap)
Small foreign rivals’ competitive experience (experience-
weighted overlap)
Large foreign rivals’ competitive experience (experience-
weighted overlap)
Overlap with foreign rivals times calendar year (1956 = 0)
* The data include 171 organizations over 1,538 organization-years.
Min. Max. Mean S D.
0 42 6.91 7.04
0 42 27.29 7.99
0 4 .73 .77
0 9 1.23 1.48
0 11979.1 243.06 974.19
0 2787 530 508
0 771 135 141
0 85 42 25
0 85 55 22
0 7.225 3.543 2.352
0 51 20 15
0 22 5.65 4.79
0 9 1.82 2.01
0 17 3.82 3.76
0 51 15.11 12.85
0 167.49 31.41 37.52
0 143 10.57 17.20
0 167.49 20.84 33.03
0 1098 270 285
0 292 64 69
0 873 205 233
0 616 160 141
0 85 34 20.59
0 46 10.65 9.39
0 1978 402 438
0 624 107 126
0 1354 295 326
0 1334 313 291
gregated density terms show that competition has been
strong, but localized in the disk drive market, both geographi-
cally and technologically. According to model 4, an organiza-
tion faces strong competition from domestic rivals that have
products in the same form factor and capacity level, while
non-overlapping domestic rivals have a much smaller compet-
itive effect. Foreign rivals, meanwhile, actually have a mutual-
istic effect, lowering the failure rates of other organizations.
This pattern is consistent with models that reveal geographi-
cally localized competition together with life-enhancing legiti-
macy effects coming from increases in numbers of organiza-
tions over broader geographic areas (Carroll and Hannan,
2000).
The models in tables 4a and 4b investigate Red Queen com-
petition. Model 5 includes the effect of a firm’s competitive
experience on its own exit rate, as well as the effect of its
rivals’ competitive experience. Model 6 then distinguishes
between these experience effects according to whether
competition was experienced when an organization was
small or when it was large and also allows the effects of
domestic density to vary by the size of rivals. Supporting
hypothesis 1, there is strong evidence of Red Queen evolu-
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Table 3a
Baseline Models of Competition: Market Exit Rates among Disk Drive Manufacturers Worldwide, 1956–1998*
X
Independent Variable
Number of low-capacity form factors produced by organization
Number of medium- and high-capacity form factors produced by
organization
Hard-drive sales ($mil) by organization (large only)
Organization was founded de novo
Organization has captive production
Organization manufactures in Asia
Number of computer manufacturers in the form factors produced by
the organization
Entries of computer manufacturers in the form factors produced by the
organization
Number of rivals worldwide in year of organization’s founding
Number of rivals worldwide
(Number of rivals worldwide)2
Overlap with domestic rivals (by form factor and capacity)
Non-overlap with domestic rivals
Number of foreign rivals
Log likelihood
Degrees of freedom
• p < .10; •• p < .05.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Each model also includes market tenure, calendar year, form factor, and region
effects, as shown in table 3b. The data cover 1,538 organization-years, 171 organizations, and 157 exits.
Model
.(1) .(2) .(3) .(4)
–.3855 –.3456 –.3621 –.4188•
(.2347) (.2389) (.2385) (.2384)
–.2751• –.2714• –.2700• –.2286
(.1570) (.1579) (.1573) (.1599)
–.0031• –.0032• –.0031• –.0032•
(.0017) (.0018) (.0017) (.0018)
.2265 .2260 .2330 .1977
(.2089) (.2106) (.2093) (.2070)
.3010 .3037 .3094 .3909
(.2607) (.2635) (.2602) (.2681)
.1507 .1675 .1659 .3116
(.2751) (.2875) (.2766) (.2830)
–.0003 –.0010 –.0006 –.0001
(.0006) (.0010) (.0008) (.0008)
.0007 .0015 .0009 .0009
(.0022) (.0024) (.0022) (.0023)
–.0015
(.0065)
.0317 .0027
(.0357) (.0048)
–.2617
(.3204)
.0686••
(.0237)
.0318••
(.0123)
–.0215••
(.0085)
–106.20 –105.69 –106.04 –98.81
31 34 32 34
tion revealed in these models, but only due to competition
experienced by organizations when they are small. We do
not find differences in failure rates due to experience in other
industries (the de novo/de alio comparison). Conditional on
survival, firms that faced more competition in the past are
less likely to fail, but only if they were small when they expe-
rienced this prior competition.
These effects are described in figure 3, based on the esti-
mates from model 14, the preferred specification from the
most complete models. Figure 3 shows the combined
effects of an organization’s market tenure, size, and competi-
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Table 3b
Estimated Market Tenure, Calendar Year, Form Factor, and Region Effects from the Models in Table 3a*
X
Independent Variable
Organization of market tenure 0–1 year
Organization of market tenure 1–3 years
Organization of market tenure 3–5 years
Organization of market tenure 5–10 years
Organization of market tenure 10–20 years
Organization of market tenure 20+ years
Large organization of market tenure 0–3 years
Large organization of market tenure 3–5 years
Large organization of market tenure 5–10 years
Large organization of market tenure 10–20 years
Large organization of market tenure 20+ years
Calendar year (1956 = 0)
Japanese organization
Eastern-European organization
Western-European organization
South American organization
Asian (other than Japanese) organization
Organization produces 1.8-inch form factor
Organization produces 2.5-inch form factor
Organization produces 3.5-inch form factor
Organization produces 5.25-inch form factor
Organization produces 8-inch form factor
Organization produces 14-inch (or above) form factor
• p < .10; •• p < .05.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. For region effects, the U.S. is the omitted category
Model
.(1) .(2) .(3) .(4)
–5.168•• –5.860•• –5.297•• –6.110••
(.7406) (1.065) (.7805) (.8324)
–3.370•• –4.039•• –3.488•• –4.280••
(.5797) (.9425) (.6229) (.6831)
–3.165•• –3.824•• –3.283•• –4.039••
(.5965) (.9415) (.6384) (.6948)
–3.034•• –3.687•• –3.138•• –3.875••
(.6226) (.9606) (.6560) (.7050)
–2.679•• –3.349•• –2.789•• –3.477••
(.6633) (1.005) (.6987) (.7477)
–2.398•• –3.184•• –2.529•• –3.095••
(.7821) (1.188) (.8217) (.8804)
–2.225•• –2.305•• –2.261•• –2.380••
(.7384) (.7446) (.7414) (.7418)
–2.768•• –2.824•• –2.799•• –2.968••
(1.027) (1.030) (1.029) (1.033)
–1.830•• –1.899•• –1.860•• –1.947••
(.5087) (.5152) (.5118) (.5133)
–1.634•• –1.692•• –1.653•• –1.659••
(.4889) (.4933) (.4899) (.4903)
–1.069 –.9682 –1.031 –1.250
(.9609) (.9704) (.9625) (.9574)
.0609•• .0584•• .0595•• .0684••
(.0177) (.0216) (.0180) (.0192)
–.4071 –.4200 –.4085 .5735
(.2752) (.2760) (.2757) (.4122)
–.9793 –1.026• –1.001 .9475
(.6235) (.6291) (.6244) (.8334)
–.3682 –.3648 –.3494 1.109••
(.2954) (.3037) (.2972) (.4934)
–.9883•• –1.001•• –.9857•• .5866
(.3528) (.3561) (.3523) (.5534)
.0403 .0435 .0523 1.766••
(.3932) (.3958) (.3937) (.5975)
–.3618 –.1215 –.2710 –.6952
(.6586) (.7020) (.6775) (.7045)
–.1377 .0998 –.0525 –.2470
(.5648) (.6112) (.5846) (.5971)
.6095 .9048 .6988 .2575
(.5354) (.6083) (.5571) (.6036)
.4692 .7520 .5298 .1573
(.5220) (.5943) (.5318) (.5674)
.2491 .2933 .2441 .0834
(.4265) (.4338) (.4269) (.4278)
.1017 .1558 .1192 –.0446
(.3751) (.3823) (.3765) (.3859)
tive experience on its own exit rate, controlling for all the
other variables in model 14. The solid lines show how the
exit rate changed with market tenure for organizations that
faced no domestic competition, as would be the case, for
instance, if an organization were technologically differentiated
from its domestic rivals. Among these “monopolists,” exit
rates increased with market tenure for both large and small
firms. Thus organizations that faced no competition suffered
a powerful liability of aging. Among small firms, however,
another pattern was possible, as indicated by the dotted line.
Small firms that experienced the mean level of rivalry
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Table 4a
Models of Red Queen Competition: Market Exit Rates among Disk Drive Manufacturers Worldwide,
1956–1998*
X
Independent Variable
Number of low-capacity form factors produced by organization
Number of medium- and high-capacity form factors produced by
organization
Hard drive sales ($mil) by organization (large only)
Organization was founded de novo
Organization has captive production
Organization manufactures in Asia
Number of computer manufacturers in the form factors produced by
the organization
Entries of computer manufacturers in the form factors produced by
the organization
Organization’s competitive experience
Small organization’s competitive experience
Large organization’s competitive experience
Overlap with domestic rivals (by form factor and capacity)
Overlap with small domestic rivals
Overlap with large domestic rivals (by form factor and capacity)
Domestic rivals’ competitive experience (experience-weighted overlap)
Small domestic rivals’ competitive experience (experience-weighted
overlap)
Large domestic rivals’ competitive experience (experience-
weighted overlap)
Overlap with small domestic rivals × calendar year (1956 = 0)
Overlap with large domestic rivals × calendar year (1956 = 0)
Non-overlap with domestic rivals
Number of foreign rivals
Log likelihood
Degrees of freedom
• p < .10; •• p < .05.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Each model also includes market tenure, calendar year, form factor, and region
effects as shown in table 4b. The data cover 1,538 organization-years, 171 organizations, and 157 exits.
Model
.(5) .(6) .(7) .(8)
–.3791 –.4252• –.4029• –.4256•
(.2364) (.2383) (.2391) (.2386)
–.2204 –.2014 –.2326 –.1959
(.1594) (.1621) (.1606) (.1623)
–.0036•• –.0037• –.0035• –.0037••
(.0018) (.0019) (.0018) (.0019)
.1641 .0641 .0881 .0718
(.2090) (.2149) (.2132) (.2154)
.3176 .2279 .2189 .2230
(.2684) (.2709) (.2727) (.2709)
.3642 .1519 .1400 .1493
(.2839) (.3202) (.3149) (.3194)
.0004 –.0001 –.0001 –.0003
(.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
.0003 .0008 .0006 .0009
(.0024) (.0023) (.0023) (.0023)
–.0063•
(.0035)
–.0116•• –.0127• –.0121••
(.0050) (.0050) (.0050)
–.0029 –.0023 –.0032
(.0043) (.0042) (.0043)
.1143••
(.0401)
.0291 –.2397 –.2048
(.0657) (.2278) (.2279)
.1199•• .4259•• .1753
(.0468) (.1623) (.2284)
–.0009
(.0007)
.0041• .0031
(.0023) (.0026)
–.0018•• –.0018
(.0008) (.0014)
.0107 .0092
(.0080) (.0084)
–.0126•• –.0018
(.0058) (.0093)
.0312•• .0239• .0138 .0221
(.0123) (.0136) (.0140) (.0147)
–.0210•• –.0187•• –.0182•• –.0196••·
(.0085) (.0086) (.0087) (.0089)
–95.76 –91.07 –91.67 –90.46
36 39 39 41
observed for a given tenure period saw their exit rates initial-
ly increase with market tenure but ultimately fall as their
competitive-experience effect dominated. Especially interest-
ing is the comparison with large organizations. Small firms
that survive competition ultimately end up less likely to fail
than their large counterparts, as the consequences of Red
Queen evolution ultimately more than offset the liability of
smallness.
Turning to the rivalry side of the Red Queen model, a com-
parison of models 5 and 6 shows stronger competition from
rivals that experienced more competition in the past, but
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Table 4b
Estimated Market Tenure, Calendar Year, Form Factor, and Region Effects from the Models in Table 4a*
X
Independent Variable
Organization of market tenure 0–1 year
Organization of market tenure 1–3 years
Organization of market tenure 3–5 years
Organization of market tenure 5–10 years
Organization of market tenure 10–20 years
Organization of market tenure 20+ years
Large organization of market tenure 0–3 years
Large organization of market tenure 3–5 years
Large organization of market tenure 5–10 years
Large organization of market tenure 10–20 years
Large organization of market tenure 20+ years
Calendar year (1956 = 0)
Japanese organization
Eastern-European organization
Western-European organization
South American organization
Asian (other than Japanese) organization
Organization produces 1.8-inch form factor
Organization produces 2.5-inch form factor
Organization produces 3.5-inch form factor
Organization produces 5.25-inch form factor
Organization produces 8-inch form factor
Organization produces 14-inch (or above) form factor
• p < .10;•• p < .05.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. For region effects, the U.S. is the omitted category.
Model
.(5) .(6) .(7) .(8)
–6.593•• –6.442•• –5.989•• –6.236••
(.8721) (.8962) (.8757) (.9012)
–4.670•• –4.431•• –3.986•• –4.196••
(.7205) (.7518) (.7379) (.7624)
–4.339•• –4.076•• –3.625•• –3.835••
(.7251) (.7579) (.7459) (.7697)
–4.030•• –3.804•• –3.333•• –3.551••
(.7334) (.7640) (.7544) (.7791)
–3.466•• –3.245•• –2.771•• –2.979••
(.7861) (.8112) (.8053) (.8276)
–2.955•• –2.934•• –2.466•• –2.611••
(.9516) (.9590) (.9734) (.9840)
–2.481•• –2.526•• –2.509•• –2.571••
(.7445) (.7457) (.7438) (.7467)
–3.018•• –3.081•• –3.101•• –3.120••
(1.034) (1.034) (1.034) (1.034)
–1.976•• –2.150•• –2.190•• –2.192••
(.5115) (.5149) (.5170) (.5171)
–1.686•• –1.766•• –1.874•• –1.829••
(.4947) (.5027) (.5030) (.5048)
–1.175 –.8907 –1.082 –.9360
(.9794) (1.008) (.9974) (1.013)
.0890•• .0935•• .0866•• .0881••
(.0217) (.0218) (.0216) (.0220)
.4072 .0758 –.0722 –.0230
(.4224) (.4511) (.4571) (.4621)
.3456 .1446 –1.563 –.0188
(.8778) (.8933) (.8943) (.9046)
.6799 .3276 .0881 .2759
(.5276) (.5539) (.5651) (.5802)
.0174 –.2328 –.5748 –.4698
(.6044) (.6146) (.6516) (.6697)
1.347•• 1.081• .6999 .9871
(.6234) (.6381) (.6681) (.6935)
–1.006 –.9478 –.9181 –.9419
(.7201) (.7160) (.7073) (.7168)
–.5487 –.2898 –.3212 –.2097
(.6121) (.6178) (.6123) (.6237)
.0908 .2963 .4737 .4129
(.6125) (.6146) (.6196) (.6336)
–.1011 .1106 .1261 .2043
(.5805) (.5821) (.5772) (.5879)
.0105 .0494 –.0201 .0997
(.4255) (.4375) (.4385) (.4443)
–.0861 –.2016 –.1409 –.0676
(.3918) (.3991) (.4252) (.4307)
again, this holds only if the prior competition was experi-
enced while the rival was small, in support of hypothesis 2.
Among rivals with no competitive experience, however, we
only find evidence of competition from large rivals. Figure 4
illustrates the implications of these rivalry effects combined.
The figure shows how the competitive intensity of an organi-
zation’s rivals varied according to the rivals’ prior exposure to
competition (again from model 14). The plot combines the
effect of density, the overlap with domestic rivals, and the
557/ASQ, December 2004
Changing Global Market
#2144-ASQ V49 N4-December 2005—file: 49402-barnett
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Market Tenure
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
Small Firm With Mean Number of Rivals per Year
Large Monopolist
Small Monopolist
M
u
lt
ip
lie
r 
o
f 
th
e 
E
xi
t 
R
at
e
Figure 3. Effects of age and competitive experience on the exit rate (based on the estimates in model 14).
M
u
lt
ip
lie
r 
o
f 
th
e 
E
xi
t 
R
at
e
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300
Rivals’ Competitive Experience
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Effect of a Large Rival
Baseline Rate
Effect of a Small Rival
Figure 4. Rivals’ effects on an organization’s exit rate (based on the estimates in model 14).
effect of the competitive experience of these rivals on an
organization’s exit rate. Among rivals with no competitive
experience, only the density effect operates, so large rivals
generated stronger competition than did small rivals. Having
to compete against one large firm that was previously a
monopolist raised an organization’s failure rate by about 24
percent, while competing against a small firm that had no
competitive experience generated no competition that we
could detect. This pattern reverses with competitive experi-
ence, however, so that an organization’s failure rate increased
as its (small) rivals’ competitive experience increased. This
was a strong effect, implying increases in the failure rate of
up to 328 percent over the observed range of this variable;
by far the strongest competition in the market came from
rivals that had survived competition when they were small.
Our findings also show an unexpected but slight decrease in
the competition generated by large rivals as they experienced
more competition.
Figure 5 illustrates the trade-off implied by these results.
Every plotted point in this figure represents an organization-
year observation in the data. The points are positioned to
show observed pairings of the competitive experience of
each organization as of each year (on the vertical axis) versus
the observed competitive experience of the organization’s
rivals in that year (on the horizontal axis). All experience
effects here are limited to those accumulated when these
organizations were small. The diagonal line indicates the
threshold of equality at which the advantages of experiencing
competition are exactly offset by the competitive strength of
one’s rivals because of their experience (according to the
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Figure 5. Organization’s vs. rivals’ competitive experience in the disk drive market (line indicates threshold of
equality between organization’s and rivals’ strength).
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estimates of model 14). For observations on this line, then,
the advantages and disadvantages of Red Queen competition
exactly offset each other. Organizations above this threshold
are more likely to survive due to Red Queen competition, and
organizations below the threshold face a greater net hazard
due to Red Queen competition.
Models 7 and 8 investigate whether the increase in domestic
rivalry that we are attributing to Red Queen competition
might, instead, be due simply to increasing competitiveness
among all organizations over calendar time, instead of
increasing competitiveness due to prior exposure to competi-
tion. Model 7 suggests that competitive intensity among
domestic rivals did increase with calendar time, but this
effect vanishes once the Red Queen effect is included in
model 8. Neither is the Red Queen effect significant in model
8, but this appears to be due to colinearity, as the coeffi-
cients of the rivals’ competitive experience terms fall only
slightly from model 6 to model 8, but the standard errors
increase dramatically. By comparison, the calendar time ×
domestic rivalry interaction term sees its coefficient fall by an
order of magnitude between models 7 and 8. Thus it appears
that domestic rivalry increased due to exposure to competi-
tion, rather than simply with the passage of calendar time.
A different story emerges for foreign competition. Tables 5a
and 5b investigate competition from foreign rivals in greater
detail. Model 9 is similar to model 8, except that the density
of rivals from other regions of the world is specified as a
technology-overlap density, and the domestic competitive
experience of foreign rivals is included in order to test
hypothesis 3. Model 10 is the same as model 9, except that
it also includes interactions between foreign rivals (small and
large) and historical time to test for the alternative to hypoth-
esis 3, that increasing global competition occurred mar-
ketwide over time regardless of exposure to competition. A
comparison of models 9 and 10 clearly fails to support
hypothesis 3. Global competition increased in strength over
historical time—generated by small and large rivals alike—
and once these effects are included, we fail to find evidence
that exposure to domestic competition made organizations
stronger global competitors. Models 11 through 14 confirm
this conclusion, showing the same pattern of results in speci-
fications that also demonstrate that the strength of global
competition did not appear to hinge on whether rivals were
large or small.
Although we fail to find support for hypothesis 3, we do find
strong evidence that competition became increasingly global
in the hard disk drive market as calendar time passed. Using
the most parsimonious specification of global competition,
model 14, figure 6 illustrates the way that competition
became more global over time in the hard disk drive market.
The plot reflects the negative effect of technology overlap
with foreign rivals, together with the positive effect of tech-
nology overlap interacted with calendar time. In the early
days, the existence of foreign rivals made a firm more likely
to survive, lowering failure rates by about 30 percent per
rival, for instance, back in 1965. This survival-enhancing
effect is consistent with the argument that geographically
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separated organizations contribute to legitimating one anoth-
er even as they are too distant to generate noticeable com-
petition. Over time, however, the pattern changes, with for-
eign rivals generating increasing competition. By the end of
the 1980s, organizations are actually driving up the failure
rates of rivals in other countries. And by the end of the study
period, the competitive effect of foreign rivals has grown to
be almost indistinguishable from that generated by domestic
rivals. This can be seen by comparing the far right endpoint
of the plot in figure 6, which illustrates recent foreign compe-
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Table 5a
Models of Global Competition: Market Exit Rates among Disk Drive Manufacturers Worldwide, 1956–1998*
X
Independent Variable
Number of low-capacity form factors produced by
organization
Number of medium- and high-capacity form factors
produced by organizations
Hard drive sales ($mil) by organization
Organization was founded de novo
Organization has captive production
Organization manufactures in Asia
Number of computer manufacturers in the form
factors produced by the organization
Entries of computer manufacturers in the form
factors produced by the organization
Small organization’s competitive experience
Large organization’s competitive experience
Overlap with small domestic rivals (by form factor
and capacity)
Overlap with large domestic rivals (by form factor
and capacity)
Small domestic rivals’ competitive experience
(experience-weighted overlap)
Large domestic rivals’ competitive experience
(experience-weighted overlap)
Non-overlap with domestic rivals
Overlap with foreign rivals
Foreign rivals’ competitive experience (experience-
weighted overlap)
Small foreign rivals’ competitive experience
(experience-weighted overlap)
Large foreign rivals’ competitive experience
(experience-weighted overlap)
Overlap with foreign rivals × calendar year (1956 =
0)
Overlap with small foreign rivals × calendar year
(1956 = 0)
Overlap with large foreign rivals × calendar year
(1956 = 0)
Log likelihood
Degrees of freedom
• p < .10; •• p < .05.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Each model also includes market tenure, calendar year, form factor, and region
effects as shown in table 5b. The data cover 1,538 organization-years, 171 organizations, and 157 exits.
Model
.(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) .(13) .(14)
–.3114 –.3762 –.2982 –.3720 –.3705 –.3724
(.2368) (.2423) (.2343) (.2380) (.2364) (.2364)
–.2066 –.1916 –.2201 –.1881 –.1943 –.1879
(.1651) (.1654) (.1616) (.1623) (.1639) (.1620)
–.0036• –.0037•• –.0035• –.0037•• –.0037•• –.0037••
(.0019) (.0019) (.0018) (.0018) (.0018) (.0018)
.1057 .1381 .1047 .1371 .1378 .1371
(.2160) (.2153) (.2160) (.2154) (.2152) (.2154)
.2436 .3188 .2469 .3180 .3192 .3180
(.2659) (.2689) (.2659) (.2686) (.2686) (.2687)
.1167 .2181 .1304 .2156 .2182 .2159
(.3236) (.3216) (.3206) (.3204) (.3192) (.3197)
–.0017• –.0019• –.0015• –.0019•• –.0019•• –.0019••
(.0009) (.0010) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
.0030 .0024 .0028 .0025 .0024 .0024
(.0024) (.0024) (.0023) (.0023) (.0023) (.0023)
–.0108•• –.0119•• –.0108•• –.0119•• –.0119•• –.0119••
(.0051) (.0051) (.0051) (.0051) (.0051) (.0051)
–.0023 –.0036 –.0022 –.0035 –.0035 –.0035
(.0043) (.0044) (.0043) (.0044) (.0044) (.0044)
.0334 .0483 .0325 .0479 .0481 .0479
(.0667) (.0689) (.0665) (.0689) (.0688) (.0689)
.1451•• .2071•• .1424•• .2127•• .2080•• .2128••
(.0506) (.0600) (.0501) (.0565) (.0587) (.0560)
.0056•• .0039• .0055•• .0039• .0040• .0039•
(.0023) (.0023) (.0022) (.0023) (.0023) (.0023)
–.0016•• –.0025•• –.0016•• –.0025•• –.0025•• –.0025••
(.0008) (.0009) (.0008) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
.0228• .0188 .0220• .0199 .0192 .0198
(.0130) (.0138) (.0129) (.0132) (.0131) (.0129)
–.0988•• –.4904•• –.0938•• –.4786•• –.4831•• –.4795••
(.0364) (.1455) (.0338) (.1398) (.1272) (.1266)
.0019•• .0001
(.0008) (.0010)
.0025 .0001
(.0018) (.0023)
.0017•• –.0001
(.0008) (.0013)
.0150•• .0150••
(.0052) (.0041)
.0152•• .0149••
(.0053) (.0041)
.0181•• .0154••
(.0059) (.0043)
–89.26 –84.89 –89.34 –84.93 –84.89 –84.93
41 43 40 41 40 40
tition, to the y-intercepts in figure 4, which illustrate the
strength of domestic competition. These results show that
by the end of the 1990s, competition in the hard disk drive
market had become global.
Looking back over tables 3b, 4b, and 5b, it is interesting to
see how the effects of national regions change across speci-
fications. These national region effects change dramatically
from model 3 to model 4, as domestic and foreign competi-
tion are specified separately. National effects continue to
change as we elaborate our model by including the effects of
exposure to competition in table 4. Once we fully specify the
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Table 5b
Estimated Market Tenure, Calendar Year, Form Factor, and Region Effects from the Models in Table 5a*
X
Independent Variable
Organization of market tenure 0–1 year
Organization of market tenure 1–3 years
Organization of market tenure 3–5 years
Organization of market tenure 5–10 years
Organization of market tenure 10–20 years
Organization of market tenure 20+ years
Large organization of market tenure 0–3 years
Large organization of market tenure 3–5 years
Large organization of market tenure 5–10 years
Large organization of market tenure 10–20 years
Large organization of market tenure 20+ years
Calendar year (1956 = 0)
Japanese organization
Eastern-European organization
Western-European organization
South American organization
Asian (other than Japanese) organization
Organization produces 1.8-inch form factor
Organization produces 2.5-inch form factor
Organization produces 3.5-inch form factor
Organization produces 5.25-inch form factor
Organization produces 8-inch form factor
Organization produces 14-inch (or above) form factor
• p < .10; •• p < .05.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. For region effects, the U.S. is the omitted category.
Model
.(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) .(13) .(14)
–6.024•• –5.725•• –5.997•• –5.764•• –5.726•• –5.765••
(.9018) (.8715) (.8981) (.8631) (.8720) (.8618)
–4.002•• –3.682•• –3.980•• –3.719•• –3.684•• –3.719••
(.7573) (.7186) (.7538) (.7105) (.7191) (.7095)
–3.662•• –3.332•• –3.646•• –3.376•• –3.338•• –3.377••
(.7608) (.7284) (.7582) (.7160) (.7274) (.7154)
–3.417•• –3.058•• –3.384•• –3.106•• –3.061•• –3.106••
(.7683) (.7356) (.7625) (.7190) (.7355) (.7184)
–2.869•• –2.466•• –2.855•• –2.506•• –2.471•• –2.506••
(.8072) (.7721) (.8057) (.7622) (.7712) (.7620)
–2.581•• –2.127•• –2.592•• –2.165•• –2.138•• –2.165••
(.9314) (.9144) (.9287) (.9051) (.9080) (.9052)
–2.483•• –2.528•• –2.472•• –2.532•• –2.524•• –2.533••
(.7464) (.7488) (.7458) (.7481) (.7479) (.7474)
–3.075•• –3.065•• –3.068•• –3.062•• –3.061•• –3.062••
(1.033) (1.035) (1.033) (1.035) (1.034) (1.034)
–2.154•• –2.089•• –2.168•• –2.081•• –2.091•• –2.081••
(.5170) (.5197) (.5161) (.5186) (.5195) (.5182)
–1.833•• –1.713•• –1.826•• –1.715•• –1.714•• –1.715••
(.5002) (.5020) (.4993) (.5018) (.5004) (.5009)
–.8838 –.8665 –.8604 –.8733 –.8655 –.8730
(1.002) (1.010) (.9972) (1.009) (1.007) (1.009)
.0608•• .0467•• .0611•• .0470•• .0464•• .0470••
(.0237) (.0232) (.0236) (.0232) (.0230) (.0229)
–.3222 –.2302 –.3425 –.2111 –.2314 –.2106
(.4032) (.4094) (.4003) (.4035) (.4094) (.4019)
–.7030 –.5290 –.7365 –.5112 –.5327 –.5106
(.7844) (.7971) (.7802) (.7927) (.7961) (.7916)
–.1962 –.2275 –.2463 –.1759 –.2292 –.1748
(.5410) (.5600) (.5270) (.5275) (.5607) (.5220)
–1.013 –.7999 –1.050• –.7334 –.8063 –.7301
(.6288) (.6659) (.6221) (.6256) (.6508) (.5856)
.4281 .3429 .3826 .3886 .3352 .3907
(.6745) (.6791) (.6635) (.6574) (.6755) (.6433)
–.0243 .0274 –.0352 .0365 .0408 .0342
(.7302) (.7382) (.7291) (.7369) (.7220) (.7211)
.1450 .4605 .0616 .4958 .4504 .4969
(.6488) (.6655) (.6135) (.6342) (.6540) (.6301)
.6689 .5907 .6100 .6388 .5889 .6394
(.6039) (.6286) (.5855) (.5957) (.6245) (.5945)
.8339 1.080• .7630 1.111• 1.078• 1.111•
(.6014) (.6234) (.5758) (.5972) (.6106) (.5970)
.1178 .4550 .0831 .4667 .4459 .4681
(.4491) (.4688) (.4398) (.4642) (.4619) (.4547)
.0028 .4609 –.0175 .4647 .4535 .4659
(.4056) (.4345) (.4019) (.4339) (.4292) (.4272)
model in table 5, allowing for the globalization of competition,
we no longer find statistical evidence of national region
effects. Neither do we find evidence that manufacturing in
Asia affected failure rates. Apparently, at least to the extent
that our models can detect them, national differences in
organizational failure rates in the hard disk drive market
appear to be due to differences in the competitive landscape.
Fully specifying the competitive landscape also was impor-
tant to obtaining unbiased estimates of product strategy
effects. In particular, some of the models in tables 3a and 4a
show marginally significant differences in the failure rate
depending on the capacity levels of firms’ product offerings.
These differences no longer appear once the various compet-
itive effects are fully specified in table 5a. Meanwhile, we ini-
tially see no apparent differences in failure rates due to firms’
choices of form factors (in tables 3b and 4b), but significantly
greater failure rates appear for the 5.25-inch form factor once
competition is fully modeled in table 5b. In these ways, we
were not able to correctly recognize the survival implications
of product strategies until we fully modeled the different
sources of competition to which organizations were exposed
due to these strategies.
Finally, we find strong community ecology effects. On the
one hand, we see clear symbiosis between the population of
computer manufacturers and disk drive manufacturers: failure
rates fall among hard disk drive firms with increases in the
population of computer firms for whom they manufactured.
But we do not find that this symbiosis was “internalized” by
organizations that vertically integrated between the hard disk
drive and computer industries, in that captive producers did
not enjoy greater survival chances; in fact, the “captive” vari-
able has a positive, though non-significant effect on the fail-
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Figure 6. The development of global competition among disk drive manufacturers (based on the estimates of
model 14).
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ure rate. It appears, then, that evidence of symbiosis
between computer manufacturing and disk drive manufactur-
ing could be found only at the population level.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Why are some organizations more competitive than others?
As we have demonstrated, the answer to this question
hinges on the logic one chooses to guide the study of com-
petition. Understood as a contest, competition in the disk
drive industry has clearly favored organizations with the abili-
ty to orchestrate continuous product development over time,
in short, the largest hard disk drive firms that remained dis-
proportionately at the cutting edge of technology. By con-
trast, we come up with the opposite answer when competi-
tion is understood as a powerful source of constraint that
drives organizational development and selection. Guided by
this logic, we found that organizations that have been
exposed to competition are less likely to fail and that they
generate stronger competition—so-called Red Queen compe-
tition—but that these benefits accrue only when organiza-
tions are small. Large organizations, well known to have
advantages that help them cope with competitive con-
straints, appear to be unresponsive to the Red Queen
process.
Regarding global competition, organizations do not appear to
project stronger competition globally as a result of their
domestic competitive experience. Instead, global competition
among disk drive manufacturers increased over calendar
time, with all organizations generating increasingly strong
global competition. Many scholars, but most notably Porter
(1990), have emphasized the continuing importance of home-
country effects even as firms engage in global competition.
Our findings suggest, however, that at least in the hard disk
drive market, competition became increasingly global over
calendar time regardless of the competitiveness of one’s
home country. Consequently, country-specific advantages
have faded in importance as time has passed. Similarly,
although many have noted country-specific differences in fail-
ure rates among disk drive manufacturers (e.g., Chesbrough,
1999), we found that these differences vanish when speci-
fied in models that allow for Red Queen development and
global competition.
Our findings suggest that neither development nor obsoles-
cence is built into the process of organizations aging. Rather,
whether and how organizations develop over time hinges on
whether they are exposed to competition. Except for large
organizations, those that have endured competition are likely
to be better adapted and may even appear to have moved
down a learning curve. By contrast, organizations that have
remained isolated from competition will not have been
spurred by Red Queen evolution and consequently are more
likely to exhibit liabilities of senescence and obsolescence as
their ages increase (Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994). In nei-
ther case, however, are these the inevitable outcomes of
aging. We found instead that change in survival chances over
time depends on whether organizations have been exposed
to competition.
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Our results also reveal a possible unintended consequence of
technological differentiation. A large literature in strategic
management emphasizes the fact that organizations perform
better and have better life chances when they are differenti-
ated on various dimensions. Organizational ecology research,
too, demonstrates that competition is localized on various
dimensions (McPherson, 1983; Hannan and Freeman, 1989;
Baum and Mezias, 1992; Baum and Singh, 1994; Podolny,
Stuart, and Hannan, 1996; Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Our
findings suggest that organizations pay a hidden cost for
such differentiation. Isolation from competition has obvious
current-time benefits but also has the less-obvious downside
that it deprives an organization of the engine of development.
The more that change is driven by Red Queen evolution, the
more will there be a trade-off between positional advantage
that isolates an organization from competition and the advan-
tages that come from the development of new capabilities.
In this way, positional- and capabilities-based advantage may
be inversely related, with those in safe places enjoying their
positions but suffering over time as they fall behind those
who remain in the race.
These results speak, as well, to the growing literature on
“coevolution” among organizations. Early attempts at linking
organizations to their environment in a system of reciprocal
causality did not advance beyond speculative frameworks
(Emery and Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968). More recently, reci-
procal causality has been addressed insofar as organizations
refer to one another in a process of social comparison
(White, 1981) or in strategies of imitation (Mezias and Lant,
1994). Some research describes such reciprocal processes as
“coevolution,” with reference by analogy to developments in
biology (e.g., Baum and Singh, 1994). The strength of
research in this vein is that we now know of various regulato-
ry, technical, and organizational processes that run in parallel
and that affect one another as they develop over time (see
various papers in Baum and McKelvey, 1999, for example).
The downside, thus far, is that research on coevolution often
fails to produce falsifiable hypotheses. Our model, though it
features reciprocal causality, is sufficiently explicit that it
makes falsifiable predictions. We hope that other work in the
general area of coevolution will take a similarly explicit model-
ing approach.
To conclude, we think it is useful to consider the dynamic
implications of the prevailing sociological view of competition
as a constraining force. Seen as part of an ongoing, coevolu-
tionary dynamic, such competition may be managed by large,
formidable organizations, but this may not work to their
advantage. Intentions notwithstanding, the ultimate conse-
quences of organizations’ efforts to strategize around, direct-
ly manage, or otherwise control the incidence and impact of
competition may be to hinder their own development, or at
least to allow organizations to survive that would otherwise
have been selected out. Informed by this possibility, our
analyses of competition will be able to reveal this potentially
important source of competitive weakness among our most
formidable organizations.
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APPENDIX: Data on the Global Hard Disk Drive Market
Data on every organization ever to manufacture a hard disk drive were gath-
ered from market research reports, publicly available financial information,
industry participants, and an extensive search of the business press. From
these disparate sources, we compiled the life history of each disk drive com-
pany. These histories cover market entry and exit dates, sales, presence in
each year in a given “form factor” (the physical size of a disk drive), prod-
ucts’ technical specifications, acquisition history, and nationality for each
company that made a hard disk drive since the first known manufacture of a
disk in 1956 through 1998. The resulting database includes 171 organizations
that manufactured hard disk drives at any time or place over the period.
Nearly all organizations (155) exited the industry by the end of 1998. The
data cover 1,538 organization-years.
The primary source of data for this study is the Disk/Trend Report: Rigid Disk
Drives, published annually since 1977 by Disk/Trend, Inc., a market research
company in Mountain View, California. These reports track every known
company that made hard disk drives, list detailed product specifications and
shipment dates, and publish revenue and unit shipment information by form
factor and capacity range. The reports do not, however, list the date of first
entry for many companies that produced disk drives before 1976. In several
instances, companies operating in 1976 shipped their first disk drives in the
1960s, but these products were no longer in production when the first
Disk/Trend Report was published and so “first shipment” dates could not be
determined. We contacted surviving companies for information, spoke with
retired engineers involved in the development of a company’s first disk drive
for both surviving and former disk drive producers and often received copies
of written technical and market information in their possession, reviewed
company documents in the files of Disk/Trend, Inc., and researched compa-
ny histories in books, financial reports, and the business press. Reports by
two market research firms in particular were basic sources of information on
product specifications and shipment dates of firms operating during the
1960s and early 1970s (HTW, 1970; MDS, 1972). These searches resulted in
earlier entry dates than would otherwise be inferred from information in
Disk/Trend for 20 of 32 firms making disk drives as of January 1, 1976. An
additional 17 companies made disk drives but exited the industry before
Disk/Trend was first published. Of these 37 firms (20 plus 17), precise dates
of first shipment for 15 companies were unavailable; instead, entry dates
were set at three months after first product announcement.
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Life events were coded so that name changes and reorganizations were not
counted as entries and exits. A number of disk drive companies changed
their names or were acquired during the period of study. Name changes
sometimes occurred when a parent firm announced a new strategy. In these
cases, the disk drive operations may have been combined with some other
corporate activity. These were not coded as market exits. For instance, Eng-
land’s Data Recording Instruments put its disk drive operations into a newly
formed peripherals operation named Data Recording Equipment in 1978, and
its name was changed again in 1982 to Newbury Data after it was combined
with other operations. Over time these incarnations were treated as the
same entity, so its reorganizations were not counted as entries or exits. Nor
did we code as exits any acquisitions of disk drive firms by non-disk drive
companies if the disk drive operations were left largely intact. For example,
Perkin Elmer acquired Wangco, a disk drive maker. Wangco then continued
to make disk drives as a Perkin Elmer subsidiary. The acquisition was thus
not coded as an exit (or a new entry). By contrast, if a company was liquidat-
ed and the liquidated assets formed the basis of a new company, then the
two events were coded as an exit and an entry.
To investigate the technology race in this industry, we coded for each firm
whether it shipped a product in a particular form factor and capacity range in
any given year. The bulk of shipments were non-captive market transactions,
and our analysis of the technology positions of each firm was restricted to
these shipments. We did include firms in the survival analysis, however,
even if they only engaged in captive production. We relied on Disk/Trend
technology classifications for all 1976–1998 observations. Disk/Trend created
product group categories by drive type (cartridge disk drives, disk pack
drives, fixed disk drives) and by capacity range (30–60 megabytes, 100–300
megabytes, etc.). Because of the dramatic improvements in disk drive
capacity over the years, these categories evolved over time. For instance, in
1976, Disk/Trend created nine product groups, including a group consisting
of firms shipping disk drives of less than 12 megabytes and one consisting
of firms shipping disk drives greater than 200 megabytes. In 1996, nine
product groups were also used, but this time the smallest capacity range for
a product group was less than 500 megabytes and the largest was for more
than 20 gigabytes. We coded whether a given product group (capacity range)
represented a relatively “low-,” “medium-,” or “high-” capacity disk drive for
that form factor in that year. Thus, the technological position of a firm in a
given form factor was made relative to that of other firms in the same form
factor (other firms shipping 5.25-inch drives, for example) and not across
form factors, and a disk drive that was a high-capacity product in one year
could become a medium- or low-capacity product in the next year or two.
This approach allowed us to specify in our models the precise technological
domain of each organization in each year. For instance, an organization offer-
ing both 3.5-inch and 5.25-inch products in a given year could have been in
any of six technology segments: low-, medium-, and high-capacity within the
3.5-inch form factor and low-, medium-, and high-capacity within the 5.25-
inch form factor. If this organization were in all six of these segments, then a
rival that overlaps this organization in only one of these six segments would
contribute 1/6 to the organization’s technology-overlap density score. By con-
trast, a rival that offered products in all six of these areas would contribute
one to the organization’s technology-overlap score. At the extremes, if an
organization produced in the same form factors and capacity levels as all
other manufacturers, then its technology-overlap density would equal simply
the number of other organizations. If an organization did not overlap with any
other manufacturers, however, then its technology-overlap density would
equal 0, reflecting its complete technological differentiation.
Although the Disk/Trend Report is an incredibly rich and exhaustive source of
information on products, revenues, and shipment volumes, its use requires
some care. When a disk drive company acquires another, Disk/Trend lists the
combined products under the name of the acquiring firm, however,
Disk/Trend notes the shipment dates of products that were originally devel-
oped by the acquired firm as the dates of first shipment, not dates of first
shipment by the acquiring firm. Knowing this, we took care not to code a
company as shipping a particular disk drive earlier than it actually had. More-
over, many products were announced that never shipped, and sometimes
the same product was reportedly shipped on two different dates depending
on the year of the Disk/Trend Report. A couple of companies, such as Mem-
orex Telex, were listed as disk drive companies when in fact they only resold
drives made by other manufacturers. In a few cases it was not clear that a
company actually ever shipped a product. For example, Disk/Trend Report
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would describe a new company and list its products, all of which were
scheduled to be shipped sometime after the publication date of Disk/Trend
Report. That company would not appear in the next year’s report, however,
and it was unclear whether the firm in fact shipped the products, only to exit
before Disk/Trend was published the following year, or else never shipped.
We checked each of the more than 10,000 products listed in the Disk/Trend
Reports (including the same product appearing in more than one year) for
such anomalies. When we encoutered problems, we contacted Disk/Trend,
Inc. staff, who always kindly helped us to clarify.
We also had to classify products and capacity ranges for 1956–1975, prior to
the publication of Disk/Trend. This required creating product groups that mir-
rored the technological state of the industry. We started by extending the
1976 product group classifications back in time until they seemed to collide
with the reality of the products being offered. This resulted in a gradual
reduction in the number of product groups in the 14-inch form factor and the
creation of product groups for larger form factors. First, as was the practice
in Disk/Trend, we grouped together similarly sized form factors. Thus, 39-
inch, 34-inch, and 31-inch products were grouped together as one form fac-
tor; 28-inch, 26-inch, and 24-inch products were similarly grouped; and 16-
inch, 14-inch and 12-inch products were classified as a single form factor.
(For reporting purposes, Disk/Trend, for example, grouped 10.5-inch drives
with the 14-inch form factor, 9-inch drives with 8-inch, 3.9-inch drives with
3.5-inch, 3-inch drives with 2.5-inch, and 1.3-inch drives with 1.8-inch.) Only
a few new capacity ranges were created for the 1956–1975 period. This pro-
cedure affected 282 firm-year observations.
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